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Abstract:   
The paper examines the redistributive effect achieved by the tax-benefit system in 
Mexico in 2012 using personal income tax, indirect taxes, social security contributions 
and social benefits. Our goal is to analyze progressivity of the fiscal system and go 
further to demonstrate how the different taxes and benefits contribute to the total 
redistribution effect. A set of popular tools of studying progressivity, such as the 
concentration curves and Kakwani progressivity index, are used. In addition, we propose 
an analytical method to decompose the total progressivity measured by the contributions 
of different taxes or benefits. We conclude that Mexican tax-benefit system is 
progressive, with greater pre-fiscal income inequality and high redistributive effect for 
some specific figures of transfers. The contribution from Vertical Equity (VE) is relatively 
important, but Horizontal Inequity (HI) lightens its impact. Income taxation does not 
contribute largely to VE. Further, some program benefits target unequally the deprived 
population, and then decreases the positive effect induced by VE. 
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During	the	 last	century,	 taxation	and	social	 transfers	have	been	of	great	relevance	for	many	
Latin	American	countries	including	Mexico.	The	transfers	related	to	social	programs	provide	
income	 assistance	 in	 the	 form	 of	 social	 benefits	 to	 deprived	 people,	 being	 unemployed,	 for	
maternity,	 food	 stamps,	 work	 injury,	 sickness,	 old	 age,	 or	 even	 for	 training	 to	 increase	
opportunities	 in	 the	 labor	 market.	 Many	 of	 these	 transfers	 are	 financed	 by	 social	 security	
contributions,	as	well	as	by	other	taxes	(direct	or	indirect).	In	this	paper,	we	focus	on	tax	and	
benefit	 systems	 consisting	 of	 social	 transfers,	 personal	 income	 tax	 and	 indirect	 taxes	 in	








for	 the	 income	 tax	 where	 low‐income	 earners	 have	 a	 low	 tax	 burden,	 this	 progressivity	 is	
lightened	by	the	non‐progressivity	of	VAT.	
“Equal	 must	 be	 treated	 equally”:	 this	 ethical	 value	 is	 related	 with	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	
Horizontal	inequality	(HI)	on	redistributive	effect,	and	where	the	governmental	intervention	
may	increase	income	disparities.	To	assess	the	extent	of	HI	and	its	impact,	we	adopt	Duclos‐
Jalbert‐Araar	 (2003)	 approach	 (DJA	 henceforth).	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 also	 develop	 a	 new	




with	 temporary	employment,	as	 the	most	relevant).	The	selection	 is	based	on	 the	relevance	
and	the	potential	to	fight	poverty	of	these	programs.	Only	four	prior	benefits	described	have	
recently	 shown	 a	 high	 level	 of	 progressivity	 on	 its	 allocation	 for	 the	 Mexican	 households	
(CONEVAL,	 2009).†	 Such	 programs	 should	 have	 a	 greater	 impact	 on	 these	 groups	 of	
individuals	and	taxpayers,	i.e.	should	be	the	main	recipients	of	the	resources.	
The	rest	of	 the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	In	section	2,	we	provide	a	 literature	review	of	













social	 welfare	 of	 population.	 This	 can	 be	 performed	 the	 usual	 through	 to	 redistributive	
mechanisms	 of	 income,	 which	 are	 the	 collection	 of	 taxes	 and	 the	 provision	 of	 benefit	
programs.	 The	 redistribution	 of	 income	 is	 regularly	 justified	 when	 failures	 occur	 in	 free	
markets.	 The	 study	 of	 progressivity	 and	 redistributive	 effect	 constitute	 a	 basic	 input	 to	






of	 a	 tax	 structure	 that	 emphasizes	 government	 revenue	 through	 indirect	 taxes	 (Bird	 and	
Gendron,	 2011)	 which	 can	 be	 the	 basis	 for	 an	 effective	 mechanism	 for	 redistribution;	
conversely,	 this	 recommendation	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 number	 of	 distant	 scenarios.	 However,	 a	





work,	 a	 proportional	 tax	 system	 was	 found	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 mutual	 mix	 neutralization	
induced	by	progressive	and	regressive	taxes.	More	research	of	the	topic	can	be	found	for	other	
developed	 countries	 and	 more	 recently,	 for	 some	 developing	 and	 transitional	 economies	
(Duclos	and	Tabi,	1996;	Davidson	and	Duclos,	1997;	Makdissi	and	Wodon,	2002;	Duclos,	et	al,	
2003;	 Duclos,	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Araar,	 2008;	 Kaplanoglou	 and	Newberry,	 2008;	 Bibi	 and	 Duclos,	
2010;	Bird	and	Gendron	2011;	Lustig,	et	al.	2012;	Cok,	et	al,	2012).	
For	 the	 Canadian	 case,	 Duclos	 and	 Tabi	 (1996)	 and	 Davidson	 and	 Duclos	 (1997)	 using	
microdata	 from	 the	 Canadian	 Surveys	 of	 Consumer	 and	 Finances	 assessed	 effective	
progressivity	with	 the	 Tax‐Redistributive	 approach	 (TR).	 These	 indices	 are	 based	 on	 social	
welfare	 evaluation	 and	 therefore,	 an	 effective	 progressive	 tax	 system	 in	 the	 country	 was	
found	 in	 the	 1980s	 in	 the	 former	 paper	 despite	 a	 relative	 regressive	 scheme	 for	 some	 tax	
figures	 existed	 when	 transfers	 were	 added	 in	 the	 assessment.	 In	 the	 latter	 article	 a	 more	
progressive	distribution	was	found	in	the	post‐fiscal	distribution	of	income	for	the	beginning	
of	the	1990s.	
Makdissi	 and	 Wodon	 (2002)	 settled	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 based	 on	 the	 stochastic	
dominance	approach	to	study	social	efficiency	of	the	indirect	tax	reforms.	Duclos,	et	al.	(2005)	
have	applied,	 for	 instance,	 this	approach	 to	 study	 the	 impact	of	 two	 important	programs	 in	
Mexico	(Liconsa	and	Procampo).	
Araar	 (2008)	 tries	 to	 propose	 an	 operational	 method	 to	 enable	 the	 comparison	 of	
progressivity	of	the	fiscal	systems	overtime.	He	has	performed	an	empirical	application	using	
the	Canadian	data	to	estimate	the	impact	of	fiscal	system	on	the	size	and	wellbeing	of	socio‐





	Kaplanoglou	 and	Newberry	 (2008)	 have	 estimated	 for	 Greece	 in	 1999	 the	 HI	 and	 Vertical	
redistribution	components	using	only	indirect	taxes	finding	that	a	less	vertical	negative	effect	
can	be	 attained	 even	when	more	HI	 is	 induced	 in	 the	 classical	 sense	 and	 re‐ranking	 by	 the	
indirect	 reforms	 for	 this	 country.	 Bibi	 and	 Duclos	 (2010)	 study	 the	 poverty	 dominance	 of	
fiscal	system	for	five	developed	countries.	They	show	how	the	redistributive	effect	have	major	
impact	 on	 reducing	 poverty	 for	 Sweden,	 the	 UK	 dominates	 all	 other	 countries	 in	 terms	 of	
social	 transfers,	 but	 Canada	 emerges	 as	 the	 country	 with	 the	 greatest	 success	 on	 taxation	
avoiding	 increasing	poverty	 levels	with	 this	variable.	Also,	 in	Canada	and	Sweden	 the	social	
transfers	and	the	taxes	support	one	of	the	best	results	on	reducing	poverty.	Bird	and	Gendron	





the	 most	 complete	 empirical	 applications	 using	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 figures	 to	 complete	 the	
whole	fiscal	system	in	both	countries	and	obtain	a	comparison	of	the	vertical	and	horizontal	
components	 from	 the	 two	 countries.	 They	 have	 applied	 the	 DJA	 approach	 for	 Croatia	 and	
found	 that	 even	 both	 countries	 share	 a	 similar	 background	 they	 present	 different	 outputs	
from	 their	 fiscal	 systems.	They	 found	how	 the	 fiscal	 system	 in	Slovenia	has	 created	a	much	
more	 impact	on	vertical	effects	 than	 in	Croatia,	but	 for	 the	 former	country	 the	 fiscal	system	
also	 induced	much	more	 horizontal	 inequity	 when	 sensitivity	 analysis	 is	 carried	 out	 using	
greater	aversion	to	inequality	for	the	lower	tail	of	distribution.	
Lustig’s,	et	al.	(2012)	research	provides	good	insights	in	pursuing	the	progressivity	incidence	






This	 work	 from	 Lustig	 still	 uses	 Kakwani	 (1977)	 and	 Reynolds‐Smolensky	 (1977)	
progressivity	indices,	as	well	as	concentration	curves	when	combining	total	taxes	and	benefits	






income	 giving	 insights	 that	 is	weakly	progressive	 and	with	 low	 fundraising	potential.	 Their	
results	indicate	that	the	Mexican	VAT	contributes	to	VE,	but	the	problem	arises	to	reduce	the	
HI	 existing	 in	 that	 country	 due	 to	 the	 exemptions	 and	 zero	 rates	 on	 food,	 books,	 public	
                                                            








Mexico	 found	 that	 some	 goods	 should	 not	 be	 subsidized	 when	 considering	 low	 levels	 of	
elasticity	 on	 food	 and	medicines,	 once	 inequity	 aversion	 parameters	 have	 been	 taking	 into	
account	for	the	entire	population.	Flores	(2003)	discusses	the	Mexican	Government	proposal	
of	 an	 increase	 in	VAT	on	 food	and	 transferring	 cash	 to	 the	 lower	groups	of	 income,	 finding	




those	products	 should	not	be	 taxed.	Vargas	 (2009)	with	a	 static	 approach	departs	 from	 the	
evolution	and	distribution	of	income	in	Mexico	for	twenty	years,	analyzing	the	tax	burden	in	





rate	 expenditures	 and	 24.9	 per	 cent	 in	 exemptions,	 nearly	 37	 per	 cent	 of	 revenues	 not	
collected	 from	 these	 contributors.	 In	 this	 overview,	 it	 can	be	observed	 a	 higher	 tax	 burden	





A	 tax	 is	 found	 to	 be	 progressive	 if	 it	 burdens	 more	 the	 non‐poor	 group.	 This	 implies	 a	
decrease	 in	 inequality	 and	 a	 rise	 in	 the	 share	 for	 the	 net	 income	 in	 the	 poor	 group	 of	
households.	 In	 the	 literature	 of	 progressivity,	 there	 are	 two	 main	 distinct	 concepts	 of	
progressivity:	 the	 local	 and	 the	 global	 ones.	 In	 the	 pioneered	 work	 of	 Musgrave	 and	 Thin	
(1948)	 two	 main	 approaches	 were	 proposed	 for	 the	 measurement	 of	 local	 progressivity,	
which	are	the	liability	progression	and	residual	progression.	Kakwani	(1977)	has	addressed	a	
serious	 criticism	 to	 this	 approach	 since	 the	 latter	 looks	 only	 for	 the	 extent	 of	 local	


















ܭ் ൌ ܥ் െ ܫ௑	 	 	 	 	 (1)	
	
ܭ்	 is	 the	Kakwani	 index	of	progressivity	of	 tax	ܶ,	 such	 technique	 is	 standard	and	has	been	applied	 in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 empirical	 works.	 Besides,	 the	 quantification	 method	 of	
progressivity,	a	dominance	stochastic	approach	can	also	be	used	to	take	a	judgment	about	the	
progressivity	 of	 a	 given	 tax	 (see	 Yitzhaki	 and	 Thirsk,	 1990;	 Yitzhaki	 and	 Slemrod,	 1991).	
Mainly,	 this	 exercise	 can	 easily	 be	 conducted	 by	 comparing	 between	 concentration	 and	






Lorenz	 curve	 of	market	 (gross)	 income	 ܮ௑ሺ݌ሻ	 and	 the	 concentration	 curve	 of	 taxes	 or	 net	
income	ܥ்/ேሺ݌ሻ.	ܶሺ݌ሻ	represents	the	tax/net	income	of	those	with	income	equal	to	ܺሺ݌ሻ.	We	





       PR p   L p   C p 0 0,1X T p     	
 The	transfer	B	is	Tax	Redistribution	(TR)	progressive	if	:	
       PR p   C p L p 0 0,1B X p     	
 The	tax	T	is	Income	Redistribution	(IR)	progressive	if	:	
       PR p   C p L p 0 0,1X T X p     	
 The	transfer	B	is	Income	Redistribution	(IR)	progressive	if	:	







	As	 was	 already	 mentioned	 above,	 among	 the	 popular	 indices	 to	 assess	 the	 extent	 of	







of	 progressivity	 and	 other	 indices	 are	 based	 on	 the	 scheme	 of	 net	 incomes	 (Income	
Redistribution)	to	assess	the	level	of	progressivity,	as	is	the	case	for	the	Reynolds‐Smolensky	
(1977)	progressivity	index	(Davidson	and	Duclos,	1997).		
Some	 taxes,	 like	 VAT,	 are	 composed	 from	different	 sources	 of	 tax.	More	 important,	 a	 given	
source	of	 tax	 can	 comprise	 a	higher	 level	 of	progressivity	 compared	 to	 another.	How	 is	 the	
extent	 of	 progressivity	 for	 each	 source	 of	 tax	 and	 how	 is	 its	 contribution	 to	 total	
progressivity?	The	same	questions	can	be	applied	to	benefits.	In	what	follow,	we	propose	an	
analytical	form	of	decomposition	for	some	popular	progressivity	indices.	Assume	that	the	tax	
ܶ	 is	 composed	 from	ܭ	 tax	 sources.	We	denote	 the	 tax	 source	 ݇	by	 ௞ܶ	 such	 as	ܶ ൌ ∑ ௞ܶ	௄௞ୀଵ .	
Also,	 we	 denote	 the	 average	 tax	 ܶ		 by	 ߤ் 	 and	 that	 of	 ௞ܶ	 by	 ߤ்௞.	 Formally,	 the	 natural	
decomposition	 of	 the	 Kakwani	 index	 of	 progressivity	 that	 we	 propose	 takes	 the	 following	
form:	
	
்ܴܶ ൌ ∑ ఓ೅ೖ	ఓ೅ ሺܥ்௞ െ ܩ௑ሻ	
௄௞ୀଵ 	 	 	 	 (2)	
	
From	 the	 formula	 (2)	 we	 remark	 that	 when	 the	 tax	 sources	 are	 considered	 likewise	 as	 in	
income	sources,	the	output	turns	in	part	to	a	decomposition	of	inequality	by	income	sources	
(see	Rao,	1969	and	Araar,	2006).	It	is	helpful	to	recall	that	Kakwani	(1977)	has	already	tried	
to	 show	 how	 its	 index	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 different	 tax	 sources.	 Mainly,	 his	 proposed	
decomposition	 weighs	 the	 progressivity	 indices	 of	 tax	 sources	 by	 the	 ratio	 between	 the	
average	tax	rate	from	the	tax	sources	and	that	of	the	total	taxes.			
Starting	 from	 this	 form	 of	 decomposition	 of	 the	 Kakwani	 index,	 a	 set	 of	 interesting	
conclusions	 can	 be	 drawn	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 contribution	 of	 a	 given	 tax	 ܶ݇	 by	 its	
component:		ఓ೅ೖ	ఓ೅ ሺܥ்௞ െ ܩ௑ሻ	:	






Besides	 the	 proposed	 decomposition	 of	 the	 Kakwani	 index,	 we	 propose	 also	 the	
decomposition			Reynolds‐Smolensky	(1977)	index	as	follows:	
	
ܫ்ܴ ൌ ∑ ఓ೅ೖ		ఓ೉ିఓ೅ ሺܥ்௞ െ ܩ௑ሻ
௄௞ୀଵ 		 	 	 (3)	
	
It	is	evident	that	the	relative	contribution	of	taxes	to	the	total	progressivity	will	be	the	same	
for	 the	 proposed	 decompositions	 of	 Kakwani	 and	 Reynolds‐Smolensky	 indices	 of	
progressivity	 and	 will	 add	 up	 to	 one.	 Further,	 these	 decompositions	 are	 relevant	 because	
when	we	observe	 a	 low	 level	 of	 progressivity	 for	 any	 tax,	 like	VAT	 for	 instance,	we	 cannot	
easily	determine	the	source	of	this	low	level	of	progressivity.	This	decomposition	will	provide	












to	decompose	the	redistribution	effect	or	change	 in	 inequality	 into	 these	 three	components.	
With	 this	 application,	 we	 can	 decompose	 the	 difference	 between	 gross	 income	 X,	 and	 net	
income	N	inequalities	as	written	in	the	formula	(4):	
	
∆ܫሺߝ, ߩሻ ൌ ܫ௑ െ ܫோᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ	െ	ሺܫே௉ െ ܫோሻ			ᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥെ 			ሺܫே െ ܫே௉ሻᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ	 	 	 (4)	
VE	 	 HI	 	 R	
Where	 ܫሺߝ, ߩሻ	 is	 the	 Gini‐Atkinson	 index	 (Araar	 and	 Duclos,	 2003).	 PNI 	 stands	 for	 the	
coefficient	of	concentration	of	N	when	the	ranking	variable	is	X(p)	and	ܫோ	as	the	concentration	
index	of	purged	net	 income	 from	 local	 inequality	 (we	assume	 that	each	 individual	have	 the	
expected	 value	 of	 net	 income	 according	 to	 the	 level	 of	 his	 gross	 income).	 Let	 us	 explaining	
how	each	of	the	three	components	captures	the	extent	of	what	they	are	proposed	to	assess:	
 Horizontal	 inequity	 (ܫே௉ െ ܫோᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ):	 In	 the	 case	 where	 there	 is	 no	 local	 inequality	 in	 net	
incomes,		we	have	that	,	ܫே௉ ൌ ܫோ	and	the	horizontal	inequality	is	nil.	The	more	the	local	
inequality	 of	 net	 incomes	 at	 percentile	 p ,	 the	 lower	 is	 the	 local	 social	 welfare	 (
( | ( )) N X Q p )	and	the	higher	is	ܫே௉	and	then	the	component	Horizontal	inequity.	
 Re‐ranking	 (ܫே െ ܫே௉ᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ):	In	the	case	where	the	rank	based	on	gross	income	is	similar	to	
that	based	on	net	incomes,	we	have	then:	ܫே ൌ ܫே௉	and	the	re‐ranking	component	is	nil.	
The	 more	 the	 re‐ranking	 the	 lower	 is	 ܫே௉	 ,	 and	 then,	 the	 higher	 is	 the	 re‐ranking	
component.		






















controlled	 by	 informal	 activities	 related	 to	 the	 place	 of	 purchase	 provided	 by	 the	 same	
survey.§§	
	The	border	with	the	United	States	(US)	has	a	special	VAT	treatment	different	from	the	rest	of	








federal	 contributions	 from	 wages	 to	 the	 social	 security	 system	 (SSC)	 minus	 the	 transfers	
received	per	household	as	follows:	
	




not	 consider	 transfers	 at	 a	more	 aggregated	 level	 such	 as	 public	 education	 or	 health	 care,	
since	our	purpose	is	to	determine	progressivity	 isolated	from	the	taxes	paid	as	well	as	from	













§§	We	have	 considered	 the	15	different	places	where	at	 least	 five	do	not	 collect	VAT	or	 IEPS.	 	Those	
places	not	contributing	 for	 indirect	 taxes	are	Flea	markets	and	street	vendors,	purchases	outside	 the	
country,	 others	 known	 as	 “loncherías,	 fondas,	 torterías”	 as	 informal	 cafeterias,	 taquerias	 or	 street	
dinning	places,	Canteens	or	 informal	bars	(Pulquerías	in	spanish),	and	last	but	not	 least,	 the	informal	
freelance	vendors	not	officially	registered	according	to	the	survey.	
***	 Just	 as	 the	 research	 of	 Dok,	 et	 al	 (2012)	 and	 Lustig,	 et	 al	 (2012)	 we	 do	 not	 add	 retirement	 and	



























Departing	 from	 Table	 2	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 a	 process	 of	 redistribution	 going	 from	 the	 market	




























Market	income	 Net	income	 Total	taxes	 Total	benefits	 Pension	 SSC	
Quintile	 Share	 Mean	 Share	 Mean Share Mean Share Mean Share	 Mean	 Share Mean
1	 2.84	 487.21	 4.97	 796.65 2.38 51.63 41.13 133.56 23.03	 229.00	 0.45 1.50
2	 7.01	 1207.88	 7.99	 1,281.12 4.92 106.54 22.85 74.07 11.49	 114.14	 2.51 8.43
3	 11.62	 2004.95	 12.28	 1970.48 8.95 193.84 13.58 43.93 13.73	 136.65	 6.32 21.21
4	 19.29	 3323.73	 19.24	 3090.79 18.04 390.68 13.16 42.71 16.58	 165.04	 14.95 50.00
5	 59.24	 10232.93	 55.71	 8940.59 65.52 1420.59 9.38 30.47 35.39	 352.18	 75.81 254.40
Total	 100.00	 3450.46	 100.00	 3215.19 100.00 432.53 100.00 64.95 100.00	 199.38	 100.00 67.08
Source:	Author’s	elaboration	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
	
For	 the	 case	 of	 taxes	 and	 its	 burden	 on	 the	 population	 distribution,	 it	 is	 shown	 that	 an	
apparent	 progressivity	 is	 due	 to	 direct	 taxes	 on	 income	 (ISR),	which	 could	 be	 offset	 by	 the	
VAT	payments.	It	can	be	seen	in	Table	3	how	VAT	shows	a	greater	burden	as	well	as	a	higher	
mean	on	payments	for	the	first	quintile.	The	poorest	quintile	contributes	with	a	share	of	3.5	






Income	tax		 VAT	 IEPS	 SSC	
Quintile	 Share	 Mean	 Share	 Mean	 Share	 Mean	 Share	 Mean	
1	 1.65	 18.80	 3.50 27.60 2.26 5.22 0.45	 1.50
2	 3.91	 44.57	 6.63 52.49 4.09 9.48 2.51	 8.43
3	 7.47	 84.94	 10.83 85.49 10.11 23.41 6.32	 21.21
4	 16.78	 191.22	 19.34 152.57 20.19 46.89 14.95	 50.00
5	 70.11	 800.89	 59.67 473.54 63.21 146.16 75.81	 254.40
Total	 100.00	 228.01	 100.00 158.30 100.00 46.22 100.00	 67.08
Source:	Author’s	elaboration	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
	
		Table	 4	 presents	 the	 distribution	 of	 benefits	 for	 all	 the	 quintiles	 by	 social	 program	
expenditure.	 It	 can	 be	 perceived	 how	 the	 most	 redistributive	 benefit	 comes	 from	
Oportunidades,	 where	 the	 lowest	 two	 quintiles	 have	 a	 share	more	 than	 76	 per	 cent	 of	 the	
amount	 spent	 by	 this	 program;	 in	 addition,	 the	 benefit	 shares	 are	 also	 high	 for	 the	 elderly	
program	with	 a	 share	 of	 66	 per	 cent	 in	 the	 same	 quintiles.	 Meanwhile,	 73	 per	 cent	 of	 the	
transfers	from	PAL	program	is	the	share	for	the	lowest	two	quintiles,	being	this	benefit	one	of	
the	 transfer	 that	 goes	 to	 the	 most	 disadvantaged	 due	 to	 its	 inherent	 characteristics	 of	
operation	rules	on	food	needs,	but	in	absolute	terms	is	one	of	the	lowest	benefit	in	per	capita	
units	of	income.	The	benefits	that	concentrate	little	more	than	60	per	cent	for	the	lower	two	
quintiles	 are	Procampo	 and	 the	 temporary	 employment.	 Procampo	 needs	 to	 be	 highlighted,	
12 
 





quintiles	 oportunidades	 Elderly	 PAL	 School	 Procampo	 Emp.	temp	 Others	
	 	 Shares 	
1	 50.69	 44.07 47.51 9.37 35.18 43.86	 28.01
2	 25.96	 22.13 25.69 12.47 25.03 17.22	 16.13
3	 13.07	 12.60 5.85 17.33 14.42 9.19	 12.66
4	 7.92	 10.20 16.96 37.97 9.52 28.18	 19.91
5	 2.20	 11.27 4.05 22.96 15.69 1.69	 23.38
Total	 100.00	 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00	 100.00
quintiles	 Means	
1	 79.85	 28.86 1.66 3.70 13.31 0.90	 5.27
2	 40.89	 14.48 0.90 4.93 9.47 0.35	 3.04
3	 20.61	 8.24 0.20 6.83 5.47 0.19	 2.39
4	 12.49	 6.69 0.59 15.00 3.60 0.58	 3.75
5	 3.47	 7.38 0.14 9.07 5.95 0.03	 4.42







second	 28	 per	 cent.	 This	 shows	 how	 this	 program	 targets	 well	 the	 poor	 group.	 The	 next	





Benefits	 1	 2 3 4 5	 subtotal
Oportunidades	 50.97	 28.01 14.75 8.09 2.97	 20.96
Elderly	 12.95	 8.42 5.13 4.80 3.41	 6.94
PAL	 2.33	 1.20 0.47 0.72 0.22	 0.99
Scholarship	 4.17	 4.52 6.53 7.54 5.49	 5.65
Procampo	 10.59	 5.31 3.79 2.31 0.94	 4.59
Temp.	Emp.	 0.65	 0.36 0.22 0.48 0.06	 0.35
Others	 3.81	 1.84 2.12 1.91 1.11	 2.16







average	benefit	 for	 the	 top	quintles	 (Table	4)	suggests	 that	 these	 latter	 transfers	 tend	 to	be	
regressive.	The	program	with	the	 largest	coverage	for	the	poorest	quintile	 is	Oportunidades,	
followed	by	Elderly	 program,	Procampo,	 educational	 scholarships	and	other	 transfers	at	 the	








6,	 the	 vertical	 equity	 component	 of	 the	 tax/benefit	 system	 is	 important	 and	 reacts	 with	 a	
decrease	of	about	16.5%	of	the	Gin‐Atkinson	index	of	inequality.	However,	the	HI	reduces	the	
VE	by	about	25%,	which	is	in	our	view	relatively	huge.	The	same	feature	is	observed	for	the	












Inequality	in	gross	income	 ܫ௑ሺߝ ൌ 0.5, ߩ ൌ 2ሻ	 0.6366 100.0 0.6366 100	 0.6366 100
Inequality	in	net	income	 ܫேሺߝ ൌ 0.5, ߩ ൌ 2ሻ	 0.5798 0.5999 	 0.6305
Concentration	index	of	net	
income	
ܫே௉ሺߝ ൌ 0.5, ߩ ൌ 2ሻ	 0.5655 0.5981 	 0.6292
Concentration	index	of	purged		
net	income	
ܫோሺߝ ൌ 0.5, ߩ ൌ 2ሻ	 0.5412 0.5937 	 0.6265
Redistributive	effect:	 ∆ࡵሺࢿ, ࣋ሻ	 0.0567 0.0367 	 0.0061
Vertical	equity		 V: ܫ௑ െ ܫோ 0.0954 16.5 0.0429 7.2	 0.0101 1.6
Horizontal	inequity	 H:	ሺܫே௉ െ ܫோሻ 0.0244 25.6 0.0045 10.5	 0.0027 26.7




As	 the	 total	Tax	component	 just	produces	a	 slightly	contribution	 to	VE	 (1.6	per	cent)	and	a	
high	level	of	HI	(reduction	on	VE)	for	about	27	per	cent	as	well	as	a	great	level	of	negative	re‐
ranking	 (12.8	per	cent),	 it	may	be	appropriate	 to	 look	 for	 the	benefit	 components	 to	detect	
which	transfer	contribute	(or	not)	to	decrease	HI	and	re‐ranking	the	most.	These	results	can	
be	 compared	 to	 those	 found	 for	 Slovenia	 and	 Croatia	 in	 Cok	 et	 al,	 (2012)	 using	 same	
parameters	for	the	Gini‐Atkinson	index	as	a	moderate	situation	(ߝ ൌ 0.5, ߩ ൌ 2)	to	measure	the	








the	 case	where	 the	 progressivity	 and	 change	 in	 income	with	 the	 tax	 system	 affects	mainly	
those	in	the	top	of	the	distribution.	In	table	7	we	provide	a	series	of	simulations	when	adding	
each	 benefit	 to	 the	 pre‐fiscal	 income,	 one	 at	 a	 time	 to	 capture	 in	 a	 more	 detail	 its	
redistributive	effects.	It	can	be	seen	that	Oportunidades	program	induces	more	redistributive	





Component	 scholarships	 Oportunidades procampo elderly	 Pal	 empleo	 others
Inequality	in	gross	
income	 0.6366	 0.6366 0.6366 0.6366 0.6366	 0.6366	 0.6366
Inequality	in	net	income	 0.6360	 0.6126 0.6321 0.6285 0.6362	 0.6361	 0.6355
Concentration	index	of	
net	income	 0.6359	 0.6120 0.6318 0.6281 0.6362	 0.6361	 0.6354
Concentration	index	of	
purged		net	income	 0.6355	 0.6098 0.6301 0.6247 0.6359	 0.6357	 0.6348
Impact	of	simulations	
VE	 0.0010	 0.0268 0.0065 0.0119 0.0006	 0.0009	 0.0018
HI	 0.0004	 0.0021 0.0017 0.0034 0.0002	 0.0004	 0.0006
R	 0.0001	 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0001
Redistributive	effect:	
∆ࡵሺࢿ, ࣋ሻ	 0.0006	 0.0240 0.0044 0.0080 0.0004	 0.0005	 0.0011
Source:	Author’s	estimation	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
	
Among	the	reasons	of	 the	high	 level	of	horizontal	 inequality	are	 the	 two	conventional	error	
types	 of	 targeting	 of	 the	 benefit	 programs.	 In	 figure	 1	 we	 depict	 the	 conditional	 standard	
deviation	 using	 non‐parametric	 regression	 from	 the	 benefits.	 This	 enables	 to	 give	 the	
importance	of	 local	 inequality	of	 the	studied	benefits.	When	we	 focus	on	 the	bottom	part	of	
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Mean of prefiscal income is $3,009 pesos
Source: Author's elaboration using ENIGH 2012 and Dasp v.2.3
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affected	 by	 redistribution,	 since	 they	 represent	 around	 one	 half	 of	 the	 entire	
population	(CONEVAL,	2009)	and	most	of	them	are	located	well	below	the	expected	
net	income;		
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Are	 total	 benefits	 more	 progressive	 than	 total	 taxes?	 As	 we	 can	 observe	 in	 Figure	 4	 total	














fact	 that	 the	 TR	 approach	 presents	 greater	 progressivity	 is	 the	 result	 that	 it	 burdens	 on	
taxpayer	 segments	 composed	 by	 individuals	with	more	 economic	 capacity;	meanwhile,	 the	




Variables	 Gini_X	 Conc_N	 KT/B	 std.	Error	
Reynolds‐Smolensky	 0.5521 0.5183 0.0338 0.0020	
Taxes	 C(Ti,	Bi)	
Total	Taxes	 0.5521 0.6210 0.0689 0.0061	
ISR	 0.5521 0.6717 0.1196 0.0093	
VAT	 0.5521 0.	5498 ‐0.0023 0.0108	
IEPS	 0.5521 0.5987 0.0466 0.0116	
Social	security	contrib	 0.5521 0.7279 0.1758 0.0141	
Total	Benefits	
B	(without	pensions)	 0.5521 ‐0.3004 0.8525 0.0234	
Oportunidades	 0.5521 ‐0.4660 1.0181 0.0163	
Elderly	 0.5521 ‐0.3342 0.8863 0.0345	
PAL	 0.5521 ‐0.3968 0.9489 0.0867	
Scholarship	 0.5521 0.2185 0.3336 0.0457	
Procampo	 0.5521 ‐0.2265 0.7786 0.0598	
Temp.	Emp.	 0.5521 ‐0.3497 0.9018 0.1691	
Others	 0.5521 0.0024 0.5497 0.1132	





In	 the	 case	 of	 special	 duties	 to	 products	 and	 services,	 progressivity	 is	 presented	 and	 some	
relative	 regressivity	 occurs	 for	 the	 highest	 percentiles.	 The	 progressivity	 curves	 for	 the	
benefits	are	shown	in	figure	4	as	well.	It	can	be	seen	how	all	the	benefits	are	progressive	but	
those	have	different	intensity.	If	we	rank	the	transfers	from	the	more	progressive	to	the	least	










The	 previous	 analysis	 on	 progressivity	 of	 taxes	 and	 benefits	 can	 lead	 us	 a	 good	 way	 of	
elaborating	policy	and	recommendations	to	improve	the	effects	on	each	program	and	the	sort	













source	 of	 this	 low	 level	 of	 progressivity.	 In	 others	 words,	 what	 are	 the	 tax	 sources	 that	
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Based	 on	 the	 results,	 even	 if	 some	 VAT	 tax	 sources	 show	 a	 high	 level	 of	 progressivity	 like	
those	 of	 Transportation	 and	 related	 goods	 and	 services,	 the	 total	 VAT	 tax	 effect	 show	
practically	 a	 nil	 level	 of	 progressivity	 (‐0.0023).	 Among	 the	 post	 consumptions	 that	 the	
government	can	act	to	improve	the	progressivity	of	the	total	VAT	taxation,	we	find	the	Health	
















a\	Food	and	beverages	 2.62	 0.5521	 0.2896	 ‐0.0069	 309.74	
b\Alcohol	&	tobacco	 1.22	 0.5521	 0.5973	 0.0006	 ‐24.97	
Restaurants	&	related	services	 6.09	 0.5521	 0.6889	 0.0082	 ‐375.76	
Housing,	including	utilities	 8.28	 0.5521	 0.3819	 ‐0.0141	 635.89	
a\	Public	transportation	and	
related	goods	&	services	 13.06	 0.5521	 0.6536	 0.0133	 ‐598.18	
Furniture	and	equipment	 2.2	 0.5521	 0.6055	 0.0012	 ‐52.91	
Clothing	and	footwear	 7.5	 0.5521	 0.5182	 ‐0.0025	 114.64	
Recreation,	entertainment	and	
sports	 5.14	 0.5521	 0.6885	 0.007	 ‐316.14	
Communications	and	network	
services	 4.56	 0.5521	 0.4608	 ‐0.0042	 187.98	
	a\	Education	 14.84	 0.5521	 0.5718	 0.0029	 ‐131.99	
c\	Health	care	&	related	 29.14	 0.5521	 0.4947	 ‐0.0167	 754.27	
Insurance,	professional	&	
public	services	 5.35	 0.5521	 0.7188	 0.009	 ‐402.56	
Total	 100	 0.5521	 0.	5498	 ‐0.0023	 100.0	
Notes:		 a\	 zero	 rated.	 For	 soft‐drinks	 and	 sweetened	 beverages	 general	 rate	 is	 applied;	 some	 expenses	 on	
transportation,	such	as	 flights	or	car	rentals	are	taxed	at	 the	general	rate	as	well	as	spending	on	 fuel,	
gasoline	 and	 diesel;	 private	 and	 public	 education	 VAT	 is	 exempted	 when	 tuition	 is	 paid	 but	 other	
private	educational	expenses	are	taxed	at	the	general	rate.	








system	 in	 Mexico.	 Even	 if	 the	 economic	 efficiency	 requires	 more	 free	 markets,	 these	 may	
induce	 a	 serious	 distributive	 failure.	 As	 a	 remedy	 to	 this,	 the	 regulator	 or	 the	 government	
20 
 
imposes	 in	 general	 a	 series	 of	 distributive	 corrections	 through	 the	 fiscal	 system	 and	 the	
benefits	 programs.	 This	 will	 ensure	 some	 equity	 and	 an	 acceptable	 level	 of	 social	 welfare.	
However,	even	if	 these	redistributive	mechanisms	are	helpful	to	correct	the	market	 failures,	
they	are	in	general	complex	and	can	encompass	some	distributive	imperfections.	The	need	of	
synthetizing	and	analysing	social	efficiency	of	the	tax/benefit	system,	 justifies,	 inter	alia,	 the	
corrections	to	be	undertaken.	In	this	paper,	we	try	to	shed	a	light	on	the	Mexican	tax‐benefit	
system	by	using	a	rich	and	nationally	representative	database	for	the	year	of	2012.	Mainly,	we	
start	by	studying	the	progressivity	of	 the	 tax/benefit	system.	 	Further,	we	propose	a	simple	
method	 of	 decomposition	 of	 progressivity	 indices	 in	 order	 to	 show	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	
different	sources	of	tax	or	of	benefit	to	the	total	progressivity.	




 In	 general,	 the	 tax/benefit	 system	 is	 progressive	 and	 reduces	 the	 Atkinson‐Gini	
inequality	 by	 about	 5.68	 points.	 Benefit	 programs	 exhibit	 more	 progressivity	















VAT	 that	 render	 nil	 the	 progressivity	 of	 this	 tax:	 health‐care	 and	 housing	
expenditures,	 as	 well	 as	 communication	 services,	 clothing	 and	 footwear.	 Of	 course,	
this	 is	 related	with	 the	pattern	of	distribution	of	 consumption	of	 the	different	 taxed	
goods.	
 Some	 of	 the	 benefits	 target	 less	 the	 poor	 group	 and	 may	 justify	 the	 need	 of	
restructuring	such	programs	in	order	to	make	them	more	efficient	and	less	expensive	
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Provinces	 Scholarships	 Oportunidades Procampo Elderly PAL Empleo	 Others	 Poverty/a
Aguascalientes	 8.6	 14.4 2.5 8.7 0.3 1.3	 0.0	 0.508
Baja	California	 1.9	 4.4 0.0 10.1 0.0 0.0	 0.0	 0.343
B.	Calif	Sur	 8.4	 12.8 0.0 11.4 1.0 0.6	 9.0	 0.306
Campeche	 6.5	 41.6 17.3 27.5 0.7 1.8	 4.1	 0.491
Coahuila	 4.4	 12.5 1.1 6.9 0.5 0.9	 0.5	 0.495
Collima	 55.9	 11.8 7.3 13.0 0.3 0.0	 22.4	 0.435
Chiapas	 2.9	 94.5 30.9 26.9 0.5 0.0	 33.9	 0.797
Chihuahua	 7.8	 11.9 45.5 26.4 2.3 0.2	 0.7	 0.526
Distrito	Federal	 12.9	 1.5 0.0 57.1 0.1 0.0	 15.6	 0.278
Durango	 7.7	 22.8 30.0 15.4 0.3 0.2	 3.5	 0.633
Guanajuato	 5.9	 27.2 8.4 16.4 0.1 0.0	 0.0	 0.531
Guerrero	 2.7	 67.1 6.3 29.5 0.3 0.1	 2.9	 0.700
Hidalgo	 5.6	 50.2 12.2 34.9 0.9 1.7	 0.8	 0.670
Jalisco	 29.8	 13.7 3.9 17.9 0.5 0.0	 1.4	 0.522
Edo	de	Mex	 4.0	 13.7 2.6 8.5 0.6 0.0	 0.1	 0.546
Michoacán	 5.3	 35.6 2.9 22.2 1.9 1.1	 0.0	 0.589
Morelos	 5.0	 28.7 7.4 27.3 1.5 0.0	 2.6	 0.545
Nayarit	 6.7	 27.1 15.6 36.2 0.0 2.9	 10.4	 0.475
Nuevo	León	 5.8	 5.5 0.0 17.6 0.0 0.6	 6.5	 0.266
Oaxaca	 1.6	 77.1 7.4 45.5 2.9 0.0	 4.7	 0.779
Puebla	 1.6	 48.3 10.5 16.2 0.4 0.0	 0.3	 0.658
Queretaro	 42.3	 23.3 6.5 18.9 0.0 0.3	 2.3	 0.435
Quintana	Roo	 4.7	 16.9 2.0 7.9 0.4 0.0	 0.0	 0.360
San	Luis	Potosi	 4.3	 55.5 32.6 30.4 0.3 0.0	 1.0	 0.596
Sinaloa	 11.5	 34.3 13.9 25.8 0.3 0.2	 2.4	 0.487
Sonora	 13.9	 16.6 3.1 22.5 0.0 0.0	 0.8	 0.403
Tabasco	 10.8	 52.3 2.3 15.2 4.5 0.5	 5.5	 0.557
Tamaulipas	 8.7	 12.5 44.3 13.9 0.2 0.4	 0.8	 0.418
Tlaxcala	 11.5	 29.8 8.9 17.4 1.5 2.2	 0.8	 0.716
Veracruz	 3.0	 46.6 8.7 15.2 0.0 1.1	 1.3	 0.601
Yucatan	 1.0	 39.6 17.7 23.6 0.2 0.2	 5.1	 0.588
Zacatecas	 8.5	 44.0 33.0 29.9 0.2 3.7	 3.5	 0.625
Mexico	 8.3	 28.9 10.1 22.1 0.6 0.4	 4.2	 0.525
Notes:	 	a	Total	poverty	using	CONEVAL	wellbeing	threshold.	
Source:	Author’s	elaboration	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
